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T
he ﬁnancial and economic crises that ravaged
Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and
other Asian countries during 1997 and 1998 trig-
gered one of the most abrupt and severe economic
slowdowns seen anywhere in the world during recent
decades.  Financial-market volatility increased
around the globe soon after the Thai devaluation of
July 1997, reaching its high point in October 1998.
Many countries were not hit directly by this ﬁnan-
cial crisis; nonetheless, they felt signiﬁcant reper-
cussions.  Worldwide economic growth slowed,
risk premiums in debt markets increased, stock
markets became more volatile, and conﬁdence
indicators slumped in many countries (see
Economic Report of the President, 1999, pp. 227-51,
for an extensive discussion of the Asian crisis).
We examine how the Asian ﬁnancial crisis
affected the sensitivity of large U.S. ﬁrms to U.S.
stock-market risk—that is, whether the economic
situation in Asia is related to changes in ﬁrms’ “betas.”
Following corporate ﬁnance theory, we deﬁne stock-
market exposure as the extent to which a ﬁrm’s
stock returns are correlated with overall market
returns.  Exposure is summarized by the ﬁrm’s esti-
mated beta, which, according to the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), is simply the coefﬁcient
estimated in a regression of the ﬁrm’s excess
returns—i.e., dividends plus price change less the
risk-free return—on market excess returns over
some speciﬁed period.1 If a ﬁrm’s beta rises, investors
demand higher excess returns for holding its stock.
This raises the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital.  Thus,
ﬁrms that saw their betas rise as a result of the
crisis would face higher equity ﬁnancing costs.
If the Asian crisis mattered at all for U.S. ﬁrms’
stock-market risk, we would expect the largest
effects at ﬁrms with the highest relative sales expo-
sure to Asia.  Similarly, we would speculate that the
betas of ﬁrms with relatively low sales exposure to
the Asian region would remain unchanged or decrease.
Betas are measures of a ﬁrm’s return sensitivity rel-
ative to the market, so some betas must go down if
others go up.  In addition, we would expect ﬁrm
leverage (debt as a percentage of assets) to amplify the
effects of the Asian crisis on ﬁrms’ CAPM betas.  This is
because contractually ﬁxed payments owed to debt-
holders do not change even if underlying cash ﬂows
are reduced.  This is in contrast to the situation of
equity investors, who hold the residual cash ﬂow rights.
The more highly leveraged a ﬁrm is, the larger the 
income variability to which the equity holders are
exposed, everything else being equal.  This income
variability is related directly to the amount of total
assets the ﬁrm controls or its sales, not to its 
equity base.
Our analysis begins by identifying the S&P 100
firms that reported detailed regional breakdowns of
sales for 1996-98.2 We then estimate a model of each
firm’s weekly excess stock returns for the period
1997-98.  We use the weekly excess return on the
S&P 500 as the relevant market factor because we
want a broad measure for the market.  Our model
is based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model but
extends it to allow for changes in betas, perhaps
related to developments in Asia.3 Intuitively, betas
may change in response to the Asian crisis or other
shocks to the fundamentals of ﬁrms that are not
shared to the same degree by the market as a whole.
We run a second-stage regression using results
of the ﬁrst-stage asset-pricing model as the depen-
dent variable.  We analyze the sensitivity of the
ﬁrms’ betas to the extent of their sales exposures
to Asia, where sales are weighted by the ratio of
long-term debt to total assets.  We ﬁnd that
leverage-weighted sales exposure to Asia exerts a
signiﬁcant positive effect on a ﬁrm’s CAPM beta.
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Firms that had high sales exposure to Asia became
more sensitive to movements in the S&P 500 while
ﬁrms with low sales exposure to the Asian region
became less sensitive.
THE ASIAN CRISIS AND THE ROLE
OF INCREASED BUSINESS RISK
Following several decades of rapid economic
growth and increasing integration into global capital
markets, the economies of a number of Asian
countries suffered abrupt and severe contractions
during 1997 and 1998 (Economic Report of the
President, 1999, pp. 227-51).  The proximate cause
of the crisis was a failed devaluation in Thailand,
but recent analyses of the period have pointed to
structural and especially ﬁnancial-sector weaknesses
in many of the affected countries.  At the same time,
a very large inﬂow of foreign capital during the early
and mid-1990s, and the subsequent rapid withdrawal
of many foreign investors during 1997 and 1998,
exacerbated the adjustment process.
The reverberations of the Asian crisis on the world
economy have been multifaceted.  World economic
growth slowed as the shortfall in demand from the
Asian region caused both a severe regional recession
and a deterioration in the trade balances of important
trading partners such as the United States (Pollard
and Coughlin, 1999).  Commodity prices weakened,
export competition increased in many sectors, and
interest rates fell in the world’s major economies.
Industrial production slowed in many countries
and corporate proﬁts decelerated or declined.
Despite these disruptions, the U.S. economy grew
strongly throughout the 1997-98 period.  This experi-
ence has led some observers to conclude that the
growth-enhancing consequences of the crisis for the
United States—primarily lower interest rates and lower
commodity prices—were simply more powerful
than the growth-reducing factors, which included
reduced demand for U.S. exports and ﬁnancial
losses suffered by lenders and investors in the region.
Another impact of the ﬁnancial crisis was an
increase in the observed volatility of ﬁnancial mar-
kets and capital ﬂows around the world.  Figure 1
shows the sustained increase in stock-market vol-
atility that occurred in the United States throughout
1997-98.  The higher implied volatility of the S&P
100 index during this period indicates that investor
uncertainty about future stock-market returns had
increased.  In addition, capital ﬂows to emerging
markets collapsed while portfolio investments into
the United States and other industrialized countries
increased.  These shifts in capital ﬂows may go some
way toward explaining the surge in U.S. and Euro-
pean stock-market price indexes during this period
despite increased uncertainty about global economic
growth and increased ﬁnancial market volatility.
Figure 2 contrasts the divergent paths of
U.S. and Asian emerging-market ﬁnancial returns
throughout this period.  The cumulative total return
during the two-year period on the S&P 100 index
of large-capitalization U.S. ﬁrms was an astonish-
ing 71 percent, nearly 60 percentage points better
than the risk-free return on three-month Treasury
bills.  Meanwhile, the dollar-denominated total re-
turn during the two years on the FT/S&P Actuaries
Paciﬁc Stock-Market Index (excluding Japan) was
about negative 42 percent.  An investment in money-
market instruments issued by Asian emerging-markets
borrowers that was continually rolled over during
1997 and 1998 would have earned about a 2 percent
total return in dollar terms, according to the J.P.
Morgan Emerging Local Markets Index Plus (Asia).
The surge in U.S. stock prices is even more
remarkable when one considers that after-tax
earnings per share of the S&P 500 companies actu-
ally fell during 1997 and 1998, and that corporate
bond yield spreads—that is, the extra yield that
corporate issuers were forced to pay to borrow in
comparison to U.S. Treasury yields—rose consider-
ably (see Figure 3).  Although alternative explana-
tions may exist, a single risk-based explanation
of these phenomena—high stock returns and vol-
atility, declining or ﬂat proﬁts, and increasing bond
yield spreads—is plausible.  In a nutshell, the main
effect of the Asian crisis, which began in the second
half of 1997 and spread to Russia in August 1998,
may have been to increase the perceived riskiness
of corporate cash ﬂows.
To understand how investor perceptions of in-
creased business risk could be responsible for high
stock returns and volatility, as well as increased
corporate bond yield spreads—all while earnings
remain ﬂat—we need to apply the “option-theo-
retic interpretation of the ﬁrm.”4 The key insight
of this approach is that the equity of a ﬁrm that
has issued debt (e.g., bonds) is identical to a call
option written on the assets of the ﬁrm, the owner-
ship of which has been, in effect, transferred to the
4 Black and Scholes (1973) is the original source of this interpretation of
the corporate ﬁnancial structure of every ﬁrm.  Brealey and Myers
(1996, pp. 564-66) provide a textbook discussion of these ideas.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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debtholders.  When issuing a bond, the owners of a
previously debt-free ﬁrm effectively sell the ﬁrm’s
assets to the bondholders and receive, in addition
to the cash proceeds of the bond issue, a call option
that gives them (the equityholders) the right—but
not the obligation—to buy back the ﬁrm’s assets by
paying off the debt in full with interest.  Thus, the
bondholders will end up either with their money
back (plus interest) or the ﬁrm itself, whichever is
less valuable (because the choice is made by the
equityholders).  In the case of bankruptcy, the owners
have decided that the ﬁrm is of less value to them
as a going concern than the cash required to buy it
back from its debtholders.  The equityholders allow
their call option to expire unexercised and “walk
away” from the ﬁrm by virtue of limited liability.
How does this apply to the Asian crisis and the
conjunction of high stock returns and increased
corporate bond yield spreads during 1997 and
1998?  One key determinant (among several) of
the value of any option is the volatility of the
underlying cash ﬂows upon which the option is
written.  In the present application, the U.S. corpo-
rate sector generates cash ﬂows for which corporate
equityholders and corporate bondholders have
claims.  Precisely because the owner of an option
has the right but not the obligation to exercise it, a
greater dispersion of likely outcomes—i.e., higher
risk—enhances the value of the option.  The option-
holder can capture all of the increased “upside”
while ignoring all of the “downside,” even if this
has increased as well.  This explains why stock
prices could go up during the 1997-98 period even
while corporate earnings were ﬂat.  Investors may
have bid up stock prices because the range of
future earnings estimates had increased (even if
their expected level did not change).  That is, the
value of a call option on the assets of a ﬁrm in-
creases when fundamental business risk increases.
Is there any other evidence that increased risk,
rather than higher expected earnings, boosted
stock returns during the Asian crisis?  The behavior
of corporate bond prices provides this evidence.
The “dual” or complementary approach to corpo-
rate ﬁnancial valuation within the option-theoretic
interpretation of the ﬁrm can explain why corpo-
rate bond prices declined and yield spreads went
up at the same time that stock prices went up.  The
dual approach points out the equivalence between
the call-option interpretation presented above and
a put-option interpretation that is relevant for cor-
porate bondholders.  In this interpretation, corporate
bondholders effectively purchase an equivalent
default-risk-free bond (i.e., identical in maturity and
coupon rate) and underwrite a put option on the
assets of the ﬁrm that is given to the equityholders.
From the bondholders’ perspective, the equityholders
retain ownership of the ﬁrm’s assets and are given
the right to “put” (deliver) the assets of the ﬁrm to
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Source: Created using data from Chicago Board Options
Exchange <http://www.cboe.com/tools/historical/vix.htm>.
Note: The vertical scale measures the implied annualized
volatility (standard deviation) of the S&P 100 derived from a
hypothetical 30-day call option written on the S&P 100 with
strike price at the current day’s market price, in percent.
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the bondholders in lieu of cash payment in
satisfaction of the debt obligations.
Increased business risk means that the proba-
bility of default—situations when the assets are
worth less than the debt they secure—has in-
creased.  Thus, increased business risk means that
the put option underwritten by bondholders has
become more valuable and consequently the value
of the bonds has fallen.  This implies that corpo-
rate bond yield spreads rise, as they did during the
Asian crisis.  Together, these option-theoretic inter-
pretations of corporate securities can explain why
high stock-market volatility, rising equity prices,
and falling corporate bond prices—all while ex-
pected earnings have not changed—are perfectly
consistent.  The underlying shock was an increase
in the riskiness of the corporate sector and the
stock and bond price movements simply reﬂected
a redistribution of ﬁrm value among claimholders.5
We would not expect that all ﬁrms’ riskiness
went up at the same time by the same amount.
Instead, one would expect greater stock-price re-
sponses at ﬁrms with more exposure to the source
of increased risk.  In addition, one would expect a
greater stock-price response at those ﬁrms that are
more highly leveraged; this is because they are
more likely to become bankrupt, all else being
equal, so the option to default is more valuable.
This article explores the ﬁrm-level changes in sys-
tematic risk that may have been induced by the
Asian crisis.  Systematic risk is measured as the
sensitivity of a ﬁrm to market-wide stock-price
movements.  Risk is measured relative to the
market as a whole.  Our goal is to isolate differ-
ences in ﬁrm responses to the Asian crisis rather
than to measure the overall impact on market risk.
The empirical analysis of the article uses two
total-return series as alternative proxies for the
evolution and severity of the Asian crisis.  Although
they clearly reﬂect different asset and risk classes,
these two total-return series present a similar pic-
ture of the timing of the onset of the crisis, roughly
the middle of 1997.  By way of contrast, the
money-market index indicates that recovery from
the crisis began in early 1998, while the stock-
market index did not turn upward decisively until
the third quarter of 1998.
THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL:
FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION
Our goal is to analyze the channel through
which the Asian crisis affected the risk positions of
U.S. ﬁrms during the period 1997-98.6 We use a
two-stage regression approach because it makes
interpretation of the results relatively straight-
forward.7 In the ﬁrst-stage regression of our model,
we provide evidence for the inﬂuence of the Asian
crisis on the stock-market risk of the sample ﬁrms.
For this purpose we set up the asset-pricing model
with time-varying betas.  We show that this model
can be rewritten as a two-factor model, with a
proxy for the Asian crisis appearing in the second
factor.  We provide evidence that the Asian crisis
indeed affected the systematic risk of U.S. ﬁrms.
First-Stage Estimation Procedure
Our ﬁrst-stage regression estimates a weekly
asset-pricing model for each ﬁrm i (i=1,...,39) for
the period 1997-98.  This model follows the CAPM
but extends it in two ways to allow for time-varying
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5 Schmid (1999) provides a concise overview of the argument 
made here.
6 All sample ﬁrms are headquartered in the United States with the
exception of Northern Telecom (NORTEL) of Canada.
7 Alternatively, we could estimate the model using a single-stage
approach, as a later section describes brieﬂy.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
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parameters of the model to differ between 1997
and 1998.8 Second, we allow the CAPM beta of
each ﬁrm to depend on developments in Asia,
which we proxy by two alternative measures of the
excess dollar return on a portfolio invested in
Asian securities.
The ﬁrst-stage regression model is the following:
(1)
with j = 1997 for t = 1,...,52 and j = 1998 for
t = 53,...,104 (weeks running from the beginning of
1997 to the end of 1998).  The dependent variable,
Ri,t 2 Rf,t, is the excess log return in week t on ﬁrm
i’s stock in period t; Rf,t is the risk-free rate, the
one-week return on a three-month Treasury bill.
CRISISt is a variable that proxies for the state of the
Asian crisis in week t; Rm,t 2 Rf,t is the excess log
return during week t on the U.S. stock-market 
portfolio (S&P 500); and ei,t is the error term.  The
error term ei,t measures realizations of the ﬁrm’s
idiosyncratic risk, that is, movements in the ﬁrm’s
excess return that are not explained by its comove-
ment with the market.
The parameters of interest are bi,j and li,j.  It is
important to recognize that it is the entire expres-
sion  bi,j(1 1 li,j 3 CRISISt)  that corresponds to the
market beta of ﬁrm i in the standard CAPM frame-
work (see Brealey and Myers, 1996, pp. 179-83).  In
purely statistical terms, the standard CAPM beta—
as well as our more complicated expression for
beta—is the covariance of ﬁrm i’s excess log return
with the U.S. market excess log return, divided by
the variance of the market excess log return.  In
interpreting our model, the parameter li,j is meant
to capture the possible dependence of the CAPM
beta estimated for firm i on the economic situa-
tion in Asia.  We measure the current state of the
Asian crisis as the weekly excess return on an
Asian portfolio of securities.  This is because we
want to allow each ﬁrm’s CAPM beta to be time-
varying and to depend on investors’ expectations
about Asia and the particular ﬁrm’s exposure to
these developments.
Our time-varying extension of the CAPM model
in equation 1 is nonlinear in the parameters.  For
ease of estimation we remove the nonlinearity by
deﬁning a new parameter, di,j = bi,jli,j, and
rewriting equation 1 as follows:
(2)
again with j = 1997 for t = 1,...,52 and j = 1998
for t = 53,...,104.  The ﬁrm’s exposure to market
movements, its CAPM or market beta, can now be
seen to contain two components:  An autonomous
(not crisis-related) component, bi,j, and a crisis-sen-
sitive component, di,j 3 CRISISt.  The evolution of a
firm’s CAPM beta, therefore, is allowed to depend
on developments in Asia in an easily estimable way.9
It also is possible to interpret model 2 not solely
as a time-varying extension of the (one-factor) CAPM
but as a multifactor asset-pricing model (Merton,
1973; Ross, 1976; Fama and French, 1992; Campbell
and Cochrane, 1999).10 This interpretation is valid
only if the two “factors” represented by the U.S.
market excess return and the product of the Asian
and U.S. market excess returns essentially are
uncorrelated.  It turns out in our sample that they
are:  The pair-wise correlations of the two indepen-
dent variables are -0.155 and -0.173 for the two
crisis proxies that we investigate.  Thus, we also
can interpret our results as estimates of the sensi-
tivity of ﬁrms’ excess returns to ﬁrst, U.S. excess
market returns, and second, the product of Asian
and U.S. excess market returns.  If the two factors
were completely uncorrelated, the estimated coef-
ﬁcient on the ﬁrst (non-time varying component)
would, in fact, be the (unconditional) CAPM beta.
We use weekly observations of returns from
the beginning of 1997 through the end of 1998 
to estimate the model.  We examine two alternative
crisis variables, each of which is the excess log
return (in dollar terms) on an Asian portfolio,
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8 We chose one-year windows because the ﬁrm characteristics of inter-
est in our second-stage regression are observed annually.  At the same
time, one-year windows allow for a sufﬁcient number of weekly
observations for the estimation of the parameters of interest in the
asset-pricing model.
9 An increase in the ﬁrm’s exposure to market risk has two effects on
the parameter di,j.  First, investors demand higher future returns,
which causes di,j to increase.  Second, an increase in di,j implies that,
for given expected future cash ﬂows, the ﬁrm’s stock price will decline
initially.  This reinforces the comovement of the ﬁrm’s stock with the
crisis variable.
10Campbell and Cochrane (1999, p. 7) demonstrate the equivalence of a
one-factor conditional CAPM and an unconditional multifactor CAPM
in which the two factors are the excess market return and the product
of the excess market return and a time-varying predetermined ﬁnan-
cial variable (the log dividend-price ratio in their case).  In our case,
the ﬁnancial variable is the value of an Asian-crisis proxy.20 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
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R Asia 2 Rf, where the risk-free return Rf, is the
weekly return on the three-month U.S. Treasury
bill.  The ﬁrst crisis variable we use is the excess 
log return on the FT/S&P Actuaries Paciﬁc Stock-
Market Index excluding Japan.  The second crisis
variable is the excess log return on the J.P. Morgan
Emerging Local Markets Index Plus (Asia), an 
index of money-market securities issued in Asian
emerging markets.11
We assume Cov[ei,t,ei,s] = 0 for t ° s, where
t,s = 1,...,T, that is, the error terms are serially 
uncorrelated.  We allow the error terms to be
heteroskedastic across equations (i.e., ﬁrms) but
not over time.  This means that Var[ei,t] = si
2
need not be identical for all i (i = 1,...,N) but they
are assumed to be identical for all t (t = 1,...,T).12
We adopt the seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) approach but impose a diagonal covariance
matrix for the error terms.  That is, for all t (t =
1,...,T), we impose the restriction Cov[ei,t,ej,t] = 
0, i ° j (i, j = 1,...,N).  This restriction is appropriate
because regressors are identical across the set of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc regression equations that are used 
in the regression model 2.13
We test for serial correlation using the Ljung-
Box (1978) test statistic with a standard lag length
of ﬂoor (4 (T/100)2/9), where ﬂoor means rounded
down to the nearest integer.  The null hypothesis
of no serial correlation could not be rejected.  We
used the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance
matrix proposed by White (1980).  Both the t-tests
and the Wald tests are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors.14 The White correction
procedure deals with heteroskedastic residuals in
the most general way.  In estimating equation 2,
the procedure controls for any form of heteroskedas-
ticity that goes beyond the cross-sectional differ-
ences in the variances si
2 (i = 1,...,N) for which the
model controls directly.15
Results of First-Stage Regression
Although a larger sample size would have been
desirable, we were able to obtain reliable geographical
breakdowns of sales data for only 39 of the S&P 100
ﬁrms (see Tables 1 and 2 for the list of ﬁrms, their
sales exposures to Asia, their ﬁnancial leverage, and
sample statistics for these variables).  We obtained
total-return series and calculated weekly excess
returns (i.e., the return in excess of the return on a
three-month T-bill) for each ﬁrm’s stock and for the
following (all in U.S. dollar terms):  the S&P 500
index; the FT/S&P Actuaries World Stock-Market
Index Paciﬁc excluding Japan; and the J.P. Morgan
Emerging Local Markets Index Plus (Asia), a money-
market return index.16 The cumulative total U.S.
dollar returns for these three risky portfolios and for
the riskless T-bill are plotted in Figure 2. 
Estimates of the “autonomous” part of 
each ﬁrm’s market sensitivity. The estimated
coefﬁcients, ˆ bi,1997 and ˆ bi,1998, would retain their
interpretation from the traditional one-period CAPM
framework as measures of the comovement of the
excess return of ﬁrm i with the only relevant (priced)
factor—the excess return of the market (the S&P
500) in year j—only under the null hypothesis that
there is no crisis-related time variation in this factor
loading (i.e., estimated sensitivity).  If there is some
systematic relationship between movements in our
proxies for the Asian crisis and the way the stock-
market prices our sample ﬁrms’ equity returns, how-
ever, then our beta coefﬁcients will quantify only
the “autonomous component” of ﬁrms’ exposures
to market risk. Table 3, which appears on page 24,
displays our estimated autonomous b-coefﬁcients,
where we have used the excess log returns on the
FT/S&P Asian stock-market index in the ﬁrst two
columns and the excess log returns on the J.P.
Morgan money-market index in the last two
columns, respectively, as a proxy for the Asian crisis.
Estimated autonomous b-coefﬁcients generally
are signiﬁcant statistically in Table 3, with 73 of 78
coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level when
using the Asian stock-market index.  The Wald sta-
tistic for the overall ﬁt of the 39-equation system of
estimated b-coefﬁcients is signiﬁcant statistically in
each year, as well.  Signiﬁcant Wald statistics for
tests of cross-sectional and intertemporal differences
indicate that there is a great deal of ﬁrm hetero-
geneity and intertemporal variation with respect
11For a list of the variables employed in this paper, see Appendix B.
12We control for the effects of a possible violation of the assumption of
time-invariant variances by using White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance matrix.
13In this case, accounting for potential contemporaneous correlation 
across equations offers no efﬁciency gain.  See Greene (1997, p. 676).
14See Greene (1997, p. 488) on how to implement covariance matrices
for nonspherical disturbances in Wald tests.
15This implies that the White-corrected standard errors in the SUR
framework are identical to those that would result if the equations in
model 2 were White-corrected individually.
16See Appendix A for a detailed data description.JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000      21
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Sample Firms
Panel A: Industry Classiﬁcations
Ticker SIC
Firm Symbol Code Primary Industry Classiﬁcation
Aluminum Company of America AA 33 Primary Metal Industries
American Express Company AXP 61 Nondepository Financial Institutions
AMP Incorporated AMP 36 Electronic & Electric Equipment
Avon Products, Inc. AVP 28 Chemicals & Related Products
BankAmerica Corporation BAC 60 Banks & Banking Services
Baxter International, Inc. BAX 38 Instruments & Related Products
Boeing Company BA 37 Transportation Equipment
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY 28 Chemicals & Related Products
Champion International Corporation CHA 26 Paper & Related Products
Coca Cola Company KO 20 Food & Related Products
Computer Sciences Corporation CSC 73 Business Services
Delta Air Lines, Inc. DAL 45 Air Transportation
Eastman Kodak Company EK 38 Instruments & Related Products
Fluor Corporation FLR 16 Heavy Construction
General Electric Company GE 36 Electronic & Electric Equipment
General Motors Corporation GM 37 Transportation Equipment
H.J. Heinz Company HNZ 20 Food & Related Products
Halliburton Company HAL 16 Heavy Construction
Homestake Mining Company HM 10 Metal Mining & Related Services
Intel Corporation INTC 36 Electronic & Electric Equipment
International Business Machines Corporation IBM 35 Industrial Equipment & Machinery
International Paper Company IP 26 Paper & Related Products
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 28 Chemicals & Related Products
Mallinckrodt, Inc. MKG 28 Chemicals & Related Products
McDonald’s Corporation MCD 58 Dining & Drinking Places
Merck & Co., Inc. MRK 28 Chemicals & Related Products
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. MER 62 Security & Commodity Brokers
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company MMM 32 Stone, Clay & Glass Products
Mobil Corporation MOB 29 Petroleum & Coal Products
Monsanto Company MTC 28 Chemicals & Related Products
National Semiconductor Corporation NSM 36 Electronic & Electric Equipment
Northern Telecom Limited NT 36 Electronic & Electric Equipment
Oracle Corporation ORCL 73 Business Services
PepsiCo, Inc. PEP 20 Food & Related Products
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc. PNU 28 Chemicals & Related Products
Ralston-Purina Company RAL 20 Food & Related Products
Schlumberger Limited SLB 13 Oil & Gas Production
United Technologies Corporation UTX 37 Transportation Equipment
Xerox Corporation XRX 38 Instruments & Related Products
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Sample Firms
Panel B: Values of the Variables SALES and DEBT
SALES SALES DEBT DEBT
Firm 1996 1997 1996 1997
Aluminum Co. of America 0.172 0.167 0.126 0.111
American Express Co. 0.083 0.078 0.060 0.066
AMP Inc. 0.193 0.198 0.039 0.033
Avon Products, Inc. 0.156 0.154 0.047 0.045
BankAmerica Corp. 0.092 0.079 0.062 0.054
Baxter International Inc. 0.164 0.145 0.223 0.303
Boeing 0.335 0.301 0.146 0.161
Bristol-Myers Squibb  0.104 0.098 0.066 0.085
Champion International 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.351
Coca Cola Company 0.218 0.226 0.069 0.047
Computer Sciences Corp. 0.055 0.062 0.156 0.176
Delta Air Lines 0.028 0.024 0.147 0.116
Eastman Kodak 0.154 0.160 0.039 0.045
Fluor Corp 0.095 0.108 0.001 0.064
General Electric 0.045 0.043 0.181 0.153
General Motors 0.021 0.009 0.176 0.186
H.J. Heinz  0.119 0.121 0.265 0.271
Halliburton Co. 0.158 0.166 0.045 0.096
Homestake Mining  0.192 0.379 0.125 0.202
Intel Corp. 0.302 0.289 0.031 0.016
International Business Machines 0.194 0.194 0.122 0.168
International Paper  0.112 0.106 0.237 0.267
Johnson & Johnson 0.123 0.128 0.070 0.052
Mallinckrodt Inc. 0.077 0.053 0.169 0.182
McDonald’s Corp. 0.119 0.133 0.278 0.265
Merck & Co., Inc. 0.089 0.074 0.048 0.052
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 0.062 0.062 0.123 0.147
Minn. Mining & Manufacturing  0.181 0.175 0.064 0.077
Mobil Corp. 0.217 0.259 0.096 0.084
Monsanto Company 0.069 0.087 0.144 0.184
National Semiconductor Corp. 0.337 0.338 0.132 0.111
Northern Telecom  0.074 0.070 0.153 0.125
Oracle Corp. 0.143 0.142 0.000* 0.065
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.116 0.066 0.344 0.246
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc 0.146 0.137 0.051 0.038
Ralston-Purina 0.148 0.119 0.300 0.392
Schlumberger Ltd. 0.295 0.315 0.062 0.088
United Technologies 0.129 0.119 0.086 0.076
Xerox Corp. 0.006 0.006 0.314 0.317
* Zero value is due to rounding.
Table 1
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to market risk exposures of large ﬁrms.  Results are
similar when excess log returns on the J.P. Morgan
money-market index are used as the crisis proxy.
We also tested the signiﬁcance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
intercepts in model 2.  Wald test statistics of 37.60
(for the stock-market index) and 34.98 (for the
money-market index) indicate that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
intercepts are—as a group—not signiﬁcant statistically,
and thus, are excluded from the regression equation.
Estimates of d and the “crisis-sensitive” 
components of ﬁrms’ market sensitivity. The
ﬁrst-stage regression produces estimates of d for
each ﬁrm i during each year, ˆ di,1997 and ˆ di,1998 (i =
1,...,39).  It is important to note that our proxy vari-
ables for the Asian crisis are negative, on average,
during 1997 and 1998 for the FT/S&P stock-market
index and during 1997 for the money-market index.
Therefore, to translate the regression coefﬁcients
into a measure of the inﬂuence of the Asian crisis
on the b-coefﬁcients, we multiply ˆ di,1997 and ˆ di,1998
by the mean of the Asian crisis variable during the
respective year.  The products of the means and the
respective regression coefﬁcients are displayed in
Table 4.  They are estimates of the “crisis-sensitive”
component of the ﬁrm’s CAPM beta.
Table 4 indicates that 23 of the 78 estimates of
a possible crisis-sensitive component of ﬁrm expo-
sures to market risk were different from zero at the
10-percent conﬁdence level when the Asian stock-
market index was used as the crisis proxy.  This is
about three times as many as would be expected by
pure chance.  When the Asian money-market index
was used as the crisis proxy, 20 of 78 estimates
were signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.  Thus, we
conclude that it is possible to split large ﬁrms’
exposures to market risk (their CAPM betas) into
autonomous and crisis-sensitive components.  As
in the systems of estimated autonomous betas dis-
cussed above, the Wald statistics all are signiﬁcant
statistically in tests for the over-all ﬁt of the crisis-
sensitive components model, as well as for
cross-sectional and intertemporal differences in
crisis-sensitive components in ﬁrm returns.
By adding the crisis-sensitive component of a
ﬁrm’s beta from Table 4 to its corresponding
autonomous part, presented in Table 3, we obtain
the average total sensitivity of the ﬁrm to the S&P
500 return.  This is the ﬁrm’s beta measured at the
mean of the respective crisis variable.  Table 5,
which appears on page 26, provides summary 
statistics that condense the information presented
in Tables 3 and 4.
It is important to note that the sensitivity of
the excess log return of ﬁrms we examine are
unlikely to increase (or decrease) all at the same
time.  This is because a ﬁrm’s beta measures the
position of this ﬁrm relative to the index.17 For
example, if we had the entire set of S&P 500 ﬁrms
in our sample, some betas necessarily would
decrease if others increased.  If greater sales expo-
sure to Asia added to the ﬁrm’s sensitivity to
market risk, the betas of the ﬁrms that have a
higher-than-average fraction of their sales to Asia
would increase in response to the crisis while
betas of those ﬁrms with below-average sales to
Asia would have to decrease.  The index average
corresponds to the S&P 500’s “average” ﬁrm.
Using the FT/S&P index returns in Tables 3
and 4, for example, we estimate the components
of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing’s (3M)
average total U.S. market (i.e., S&P 500) sensitivity
during 1997 to be 0.497 and 0.111, for a total of
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ST. LOUIS
Summary Statistics for SALES and DEBT
1996 Standard
1997 Minimum Median Mean Maximum Deviation
SALES 0 0.123 0.136 0.337 0.083
0 0.121 0.138 0.379 0.094
DEBT 0 0.123 0.131 0.344 0.093
0.016 0.111 0.141 0.392 0.098
Table 2
17A common inﬂuence of the Asian crisis on all ﬁrms’ contributions to
market risk would not lead to changes in the ﬁrms’ betas.  This is
because a common impact (by deﬁnition) would affect all ﬁrms equally,
leaving their positions relative to the market index unchanged.24 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
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Estimates of the Autonomous Component of CAPM Betas, bi,j
Asian Stock-Market Index Asian Money-Market Index
Firm 1997 1998 1997 1998
Aluminum Co. of America 0.810*** 0.640*** 0.764*** 0.659***
American Express Co. 1.229*** 1.778*** 1.297*** 1.785***
AMP Inc. 1.152*** 0.095 0.850*** 0.124
Avon Products, Inc. 0.733** 1.397*** 1.004*** 1.384***
BankAmerica Corp. 0.817*** 1.245*** 1.057*** 1.232***
Baxter International Inc. 1.113*** 0.541*** 1.041*** 0.523***
Boeing 0.307* 1.187*** 0.252 1.215***
Bristol-Myers Squibb  1.181*** 0.945*** 1.241*** 0.946***
Champion International 0.783*** 1.336*** 0.814*** 1.333***
Coca Cola Company 1.381*** 1.085*** 1.377*** 1.083***
Computer Sciences Corp. 1.097*** 0.788** 0.667* 0.781**
Delta Air Lines 1.033*** 1.203*** 0.925*** 1.184***
Eastman Kodak 0.721** 0.077 0.555* 0.087
Fluor Corp 0.949*** 1.198*** 1.070*** 1.184***
General Electric 1.111*** 1.351*** 1.242*** 1.334***
General Motors 0.827*** 1.112*** 0.813*** 1.117***
H.J. Heinz  0.892*** 1.818*** 0.592* 1.858***
Halliburton Co. 1.051*** 0.508*** 0.921*** 0.505***
Homestake Mining  0.261 0.353 0.273  0.408
Intel Corp. 1.074*** 0.642** 0.988*** 0.637***
International Business Machines 0.897*** 0.816*** 0.729*** 0.828***
International Paper  0.901*** 0.753*** 1.147*** 0.764***
Johnson & Johnson 1.035*** 0.485*** 1.218*** 0.470***
Mallinckrodt Inc. 0.290* 0.807*** 0.391** 0.810***
McDonald’s Corp. 0.614*** 0.941*** 0.589*** 0.953***
Merck & Co., Inc. 1.188*** 0.858*** 1.135*** 0.866***
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 1.928*** 2.055*** 1.990*** 2.052***
Minn. Mining & Manufacturing  0.497*** 0.650*** 0.578*** 0.635***
Mobil Corp. 0.916*** 0.680*** 1.011*** 0.712***
Monsanto Company 0.829*** 0.789 0.727** 0.781
National Semiconductor Corp. 1.467*** 1.039** 1.252*** 1.077**
Northern Telecom  1.450*** 1.604*** 1.348*** 1.602***
Oracle Corp. 0.774* 1.844*** 0.383 1.885***
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.785*** 0.367* 0.698** 0.386**
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc 0.981*** 0.807*** 0.924*** 0.806***
Ralston-Purina 0.857*** 0.787*** 0.803*** 0.799***
Schlumberger Ltd. 1.065*** 1.563*** 0.745*** 1.588***
United Technologies 0.803*** 1.160*** 0.746*** 1.161***
Xerox Corp. 0.973*** 0.981*** 0.728*** 0.988***
Wald statistic 1122*** 916.2*** 770.1*** 930.1***
Wald statistic (cross-sectional differences) 119.2*** 139.5*** 92.80*** 136.7***
Wald statistic (intertemporal differences) 74.86*** 66.49***
Observations per ﬁrm 52 52 52 52
*/**/*** signiﬁcant at 10/5/1 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed).
Table 3
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Estimates of the Crisis-Sensitive Component of CAPM Betas, di,j 3 CRISISt,
at Annual Means of CRISIS
Asian Stock-Market Index Asian Money-Market Index
Firm 1997 1998 1997 1998
Aluminum Co. of America 0.043 0.012** 0.046  –0.031 
American Express Co. –0.097 0.005 –0.085 –0.011
AMP Inc. 0.100 0.001 0.211*** –0.032
Avon Products, Inc. 0.112 –0.007 –0.088 0.020
BankAmerica Corp. 0.057 0.020 –0.099* –0.001
Baxter International Inc. 0.074* –0.012*** 0.075* 0.029**
Boeing 0.171*** 0.026** 0.114 –0.051*
Bristol-Myers Squibb  –0.104** 0.002 –0.084 –0.003
Champion International 0.150 0.008 0.059 –0.004
Coca Cola Company –0.010 0.008 –0.003 –0.004
Computer Sciences Corp. –0.045 –0.002 0.206** 0.009
Delta Air Lines –0.169** –0.009* –0.027 0.029**
Eastman Kodak 0.044 0.019* 0.110 –0.025
Fluor Corp 0.027 –0.010* –0.051 0.024
General Electric 0.017 –0.011** –0.061* 0.028*
General Motors –0.009 –0.007 0.003 0.000
H.J. Heinz  –0.062 0.004 0.128 –0.048
Halliburton Co. –0.074 0.000 0.032 0.003
Homestake Mining  0.077 0.019 0.032 –0.076*
Intel Corp. 0.108* –0.007 0.100 0.010
International Business Machines 0.155** –0.001 0.167** –0.012
International Paper  0.124 0.006** –0.068 –0.018*
Johnson & Johnson 0.052 –0.010* –0.071 0.024*
Mallinckrodt Inc. –0.023 –0.001 –0.065* –0.003
McDonald’s Corp. 0.080* 0.005 0.053 –0.017
Merck & Co., Inc. –0.026 0.002 0.016 –0.011
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. –0.066** 0.019** –0.066 –0.012
Minn. Mining & Manufacturing  0.111*** –0.008* 0.013 0.023**
Mobil Corp. –0.057*** 0.013** –0.079*** –0.046***
Monsanto Company –0.060 0.025 0.024 –0.011
National Semiconductor Corp. 0.136 0.016 0.182 –0.055
Northern Telecom  0.010 –0.011 0.059 0.011
Oracle Corp. 0.340 0.013 0.378 –0.055
PepsiCo, Inc. 0.043 0.010 0.068 –0.029*
Pharmacia & Upjohn, Inc 0.002 0.000 0.031 0.001
Ralston-Purina –0.027 0.012 0.015 –0.023
Schlumberger Ltd. –0.023 0.006 0.158** –0.032
United Technologies 0.070 0.002 0.065 –0.002
Xerox Corp. 0.026 0.010* 0.143** –0.016
Wald statistic 91.21*** 72.72*** 77.04*** 67.03***
Wald statistic (cross-sectional differences) 87.13*** 71.95*** 76.89*** 65.37***
Wald statistic (intertemporal differences) 91.04*** 64.42***
Observations per ﬁrm 52 52 52 52
*/**/*** signiﬁcant at 10/5/1 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed); tests refer to the actual regression coefﬁcients, not to the displayed 
products between the regression coefﬁcients and the annual means of the crisis variable.
Table 4
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0.608.  The comparable estimates for 1998 are
0.650 and -0.008, for a total of 0.642.  As shown
in the tables, all of these component estimates




We attempt to identify the link between the
Asian crisis and changes in ﬁrms’ exposures to U.S.
stock-market risk—their CAPM betas—in a second-
stage regression.  To this end, we gathered ﬁrm-
speciﬁc data on sales to the Asian region as a pro-
portion of total sales, on (the book values of)
long-term debt and total assets, and on industry
participation.  In the ﬁrst-stage regression approach
discussed above, we used two different excess-
return measures as proxies for the Asian crisis, one
based on the FT/S&P stock-market index and the
other derived from the J.P. Morgan money-market
index.  We run the second-stage regression using
the results of each set of ﬁrst-stage regressions as
dependent variables.
Outline of Second-Stage Estimation Procedure
This section details the second step in our esti-
mation procedure, which examines the channel by
which the Asian crisis affected the sample ﬁrms’
stock-market betas.  We do this by regressing the
coefﬁcients ˆ di,1997 and ˆ di,1998 obtained from the
asset-pricing model on a set of ﬁrm characteristics.
These ﬁrm attributes are sales to the Asian region,
weighted by the ﬁrm’s leverage, and the ﬁrm’s pri-
mary industry afﬁliation.
Sales exposure to Asia and the sensitivity 
of CAPM betas to the Asian crisis. The estimated
crisis-sensitive coefﬁcients from equation 2, ˆ di,1997
and ˆ di,1998, serve as the dependent variables in 
the second-stage regression.  We have one estimate 
for each of the 39 ﬁrms in each year, for a total 
of 78 observations.  A standard pooled-time-series
cross-section approach can be applied because 
the stochastic nature of the dependent variable is
controlled for by the error term of the regression
equation.
The explanatory variable of interest in this 
regression is SALES 3 DEBT, the product of the
ﬁrm’s ratio of sales to Asia (SALES) and its ratio of
book value of long-term debt to total assets (DEBT).
The reason for weighting SALES with DEBT is that
an equity holder’s actual returns are inﬂuenced by
the ﬁrm’s capital structure, that is, the relative
amounts of debt and equity the ﬁrm has.  The key
point is that leverage (i.e., debt) ampliﬁes the risk of
the ﬁrm’s underlying cash ﬂows as perceived by the
equity holders.  See the insert on the next page for
more details.
To avoid simultaneity problems in the regres-
sion model, the observations for SALES and DEBT
were lagged by one calendar year.  There also are
indicator variables in the regression corresponding
to the two-digit SIC codes of the sample ﬁrms’ main
lines of business.  No intercept is included and one
of the 19 industry indicator variables is excluded
(SIC 73).  This is appropriate because we do not 
assume a common shift in the stock-market 
Summary of Results from First-Stage Regressions
1997 Asian-Crisis Standard
1998 Index Minimum Median Mean Maximum Deviation
Stock market 1.78 310–1 9.18 310–1 9.09 310–1 1.72 3.17 310–1
1.35 310–1 8.86 310–1 9.49 310–1 1.97 4.45 310–1
Money market 2.13 310–1 8.42 310–1 8.82 310–1 1.81 3.51 310–1
1.50 310–1 8.87 310–1 9.55 310–1 1.98 4.45 310–1
Stock market –1.49 310–1 2.09 310–2 1.86 310–2 2.92 310–1 8.25 310–2
–1.35 310–2 2.47 310–3 3.77 310–3 2.60 310–2 1.05 310–2
Money market –1.15 310–1 2.17 310–2 2.20 310–2 3.54 310–1 9.90 310–2
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betas due to the Asian crisis for the reason
discussed above.18
The second-stage regression equation reads:
(3)
with j = 1997 for t = 1,...,52 and j = 1998 for t =
53,...,104.  The regressor Ii,k is an industry indicator
variable that takes on unit value if the correspond-
ing ﬁrm belongs to industry k (k = 1,...,K; K = 18),
and is equal to zero otherwise.
The SALES variable is measured with error
because ﬁrms reported regional sales on a non-
standardized basis during our sample period.19
Thus, we used an instrumental-variables (IV)
approach, which entails ranks of the leverage-
weighted sales numbers as instruments for the
actual leverage-weighted sales numbers.20 We
tested for the presence of serial correlation using
the Ljung-Box (1978) test statistic with unit lag
length.21 The t-values and the Wald test statistics
are based on White (1980) corrected standard
errors.22 We also provide bootstrapped Student’s t
intervals and bootstrap-t intervals.  While the ﬁrst
type of bootstrap intervals makes use of the Central
Limit Theorem, the latter is distribution-free.23
Results of Second-Stage Regressions
Second-stage regression results are presented in
Tables 6 and 7.  Our most important ﬁnding is that
ﬁrms’ leverage-weighted sales exposure to Asia is sig-
niﬁcantly related to changes in their CAPM betas.
Sales exposure to Asia and the sensitivity of
CAPM betas to the Asian crisis. Tables 6 and 7
provide the results from our second-stage regression.
We regress the crisis-sensitive coefﬁcients ˆ di,1997 and
ˆ di,1998, (i = 1,...,39)  on ﬁrm characteristics.  The
ﬁrst two columns of Table 6 show results using the
Asian stock-market index as the crisis proxy, while
the results in the last two columns were generated
using the money-market index.  The table indicates
that the impact of the Asian crisis on the crisis-sen-
sitive component of the ﬁrm’s CAPM beta was
associated signiﬁcantly with leverage-weighted
sales exposure to the region.  To interpret the nega-
tive coefﬁcients, recall that the average excess
returns on the stock-market index during both
1997 and 1998, as well as the average money-
market excess return during 1997, were negative.
The negative coefﬁcients on the variable SALES 3
DEBT, when multiplied by the average excess return
on the crisis proxy, indicate that a worsening of the
crisis increased the crisis-sensitive component of a
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LEVERAGE EFFECTS ON BETA
To illustrate the effect of leverage on an equi-
tyholder’s returns more formally, let the exposure
of a ﬁrm’s underlying cash ﬂows to variations in
the cash ﬂows of all ﬁrms in the market be denot-
ed the ﬁrm’s “assets beta,” or bassets, and let the
ﬁrm’s stock-market risk exposure, or “equity
beta,” be written as bequity.  Finally, let the market
comovement of returns on the ﬁrm’s debt be
denoted its “debt beta,” or bdebt.  Then, if D is the
book value of the ﬁrm’s debt and E is the book
value of equity, it is possible to express the ﬁrm’s
equity beta as follows (see Brealey and Myers,
1996, pp. 213-17):
If the ﬁrm had no debt, its asset beta and its
equity beta would be identical.  Given positive
amounts of debt in its capital structure, however, 
a ﬁrm’s equity beta is larger than its asset beta.








18We tested for the statistical signiﬁcance of the intercept and found it
insigniﬁcant for both crisis variables.  The t-values were equal to
–1.243 (stock-market index) and –1.309 (money-market index).
19For details on the collection of the sales data, see Appendix A.
20On the use of ranks as instrumental variables in regressions, see
Greene (1997, pp. 440-42).
21We use the Ljung-Box test because it is related to the heteroskedastici-
ty and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix proposed by
Newey-West (1987).  This correction would be particularly important
if serial correlation were a problem, although we did not ﬁnd any evi-
dence of serial correlation for either Asian excess-return series.
22A White (1980) test is not well-deﬁned for our regression because the
number of regressors in the matrix needed for the test exceeds the
number of observations.  This also is true after eliminating linearly
dependent regressors.
23For details on these two bootstrapping procedures, see Efron and 
Tibshirani (1993, pp. 158-62).28 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
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sales exposure to Asia.  Similarly, we would expect
a greater decline in the crisis-sensitive component
of a ﬁrm’s beta, the greater its leverage-weighted
sales exposure, if the change in the crisis proxy
were positive.24 We control for industry effects in
both regressions by including SIC code indicator
variables representing each ﬁrm’s primary industry
classiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance tests that are more reliable than
the t-values displayed in Table 6 are shown in Table
7.  For the regressor of interest, SALES 3 DEBT, we
provide results from two alternative bootstrapping
procedures that conﬁrm our previous ﬁndings.  A
ﬁrm’s leverage-weighted sales exposure signiﬁ-
cantly affected the impact of the Asian ﬁnancial
crisis on the ﬁrm’s CAPM beta.
It is interesting to note that the two SIC codes
identiﬁed by Pollard and Coughlin (1999, p. 39) as
suffering the largest declines in real exports to East
Asia during 1998—metallic ores and concentrates
(SIC 10) and crude oil and natural gas (SIC 13)—
were identiﬁed in our regression (using the stock-
market index) as experiencing large and signiﬁcant
increases in the crisis-sensitive component of their
market betas.  For both crisis indexes, signiﬁcant
Wald statistics indicate that there were important
industry effects even after controlling for the effect
of leverage-weighted sales exposure to Asia on
betas.  We do not wish to emphasize these industry
results, however, because the one-stage approach
described in the next section does not ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cant industry effects.
Effects on Crisis-Sensitive Coefﬁcients, di,j
Asian Stock-Market Index Asian Money-Market Index
Independent Variable Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
SALES 3 DEBT –1.813 3102 –2.620*** –2.563 3102 –2.729***
SIC 10 1.153 310 3.268*** –3.442 –0.351
SIC 13 4.170 2.165** –1.127 310 –1.406
SIC 16 –5.752 310–1 –0.239 –4.323 –0.969
SIC 20 4.903 1.689* 5.941 1.590
SIC 26 –5.986 –1.499 –6.951 –1.486
SIC 28 2.996 310–1 0.169 –4.842 310–1 –0.142
SIC 29 –2.940 310–1 –0.055 7.087 2.076**
SIC 32 2.172 0.448 7.452 1.527
SIC 33 –8.886 310–1 –0.625 –2.249 –1.191
SIC 35 –2.534 –1.203 –4.263 –0.987
SIC 36 1.008 0.477 –2.855 310–1 –0.081
SIC 37 5.544 310–1 0.288 8.932 1.913*
SIC 38 7.761 310–1 0.190 –3.833 –0.750
SIC 45 3.247 2.128** –1.549 310 –1.190
SIC 58 7.534 3.076*** 1.401 310 2.767***
SIC 60 –5.784 310–1 –0.136 –1.728 –0.254
SIC 61 –3.488 –0.693 1.102 310 2.980***
SIC 62 –3.452 –1.403 –4.371 –2.095**
R2 0.147 0.179
Wald statistic (SIC codes) 325.8*** 85.96***
Number of observations 78 78
*/**/*** signiﬁcant at 10/5/1 percent levels (t-tests are two-tailed).
Table 6
24The partial derivative of the expression (1 1 li,j 3 CRISISt) from equa-
tion 1 with respect to di,j is CRISISt/bi,j, where bi,j is the autonomous
(i.e., crisis-insensitive) part of ﬁrm i’s CAPM beta in year j.  As Table 3
shows, all bi,j (i = 1,...,39; j = 1997, 1998) were positive.JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000      29
A ONE-STAGE REGRESSION
APPROACH
The two-stage regression procedure applied 
in this article can be aggregated into a one-stage pro-
cedure.  Inserting equation 3 into equation 2 results
in:
with j = 1997 for t = 1,...,52 and j = 1998 for
t = 53,...,104.  We must drop one ﬁrm from the sample
(Champion International) because it has zero values
for the variable SALES (see Table 1, Panel B).
We estimated model 4 with a SUR approach
that is similar to the estimation procedure we
applied to model 2.  In contrast to model 2 however,
the regressors in model 4 are not identical across
equations, which means that the efﬁciency of the
regression can be improved by accounting for con-
temporaneous correlation across the equations in a
SUR model.25 Thus, we relaxed the previously
imposed restriction of no contemporaneous corre-
lation, that is, Cov[ei,t,ej,t] = 0, i ° j (i, j = 1,...,N),
in favor of Cov[ei,t,ej,t] = si,j, (i, j = 1,...,N). We then
applied an iteration procedure in the estimation of
the cross-equation covariance matrix.
The important results from this one-stage
regression approach were similar to those of
our preferred two-stage approach (not reported).
Both approaches indicate that the leverage-ad-
justed sales exposure of our sample ﬁrms was
signiﬁcantly associated with changes in the
ﬁrms’ exposure to stock-market risk.  Industry
effects were not robust across the two ap-
proaches, however.
CONCLUSION
The Asian crisis affected consumers, investors,
ﬁrms, and national economies around the world in
many ways.  Our analysis highlights one speciﬁc
channel of inﬂuence on a sample of large U.S.-based
firms.  We ﬁnd that the Asian crisis changed many
of these ﬁrms’ sensitivity to U.S. stock-market
movements, that is, their CAPM betas.  We ﬁnd evi-
dence that the link connecting the Asian crisis and
changes in the stock-market risk exposure of our
sample ﬁrms is the ﬁrms’ leverage-weighted sales
exposures to the crisis region.
As a ﬁrm’s beta rises in response to a ﬁnancial
crisis, investors demand higher excess returns.  This
raises the ﬁrm’s cost of equity capital.  A ﬁrm could
respond to this by reducing the share of its total
sales that go to the crisis region or by decreasing
its leverage.  As a mitigating effect, some shrinkage
in the ratio of Asian to total sales occurs automati-
cally in the wake of such a crisis because the
falling dollar value of sales constitutes a smaller
fraction of total revenues.  Some ﬁrms also may
ﬁnd it desirable to take actions to accelerate their
shift away from the region or to reduce leverage.
Another mitigating effect in the stock market is
the decrease in the weights of ﬁrms with increasing
market betas.  Even if the ﬁrm’s expected earnings
do not decrease, the ﬁrm’s stock price must drop
initially to generate the higher future returns in-
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Effects on Crisis-Sensitive Coefﬁcients, di,j (Bootstrapped Standard Errors)
Asian-Crisis Regression Bootstrapped Student’s t Bootstrap-t
Index Coefﬁcient Interval Interval
Stock market –1.813 3102 1/21.654 3102 –1.382 3102; 1.399 3102
Money market –2.563 3102 1/22.133 3102 –1.790 3102; 1.818 3102
95-percent conﬁdence intervals, based on 2,500 draws.
Table 7
25See Greene (1997, pp. 674-76).30 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2000
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beta.  A reduction in the share price reduces the
ﬁrm’s market capitalization, and therefore, its
weight in the market index.  This effect may be
reinforced by a depression of the ﬁrm’s expected 
earnings due to a decline in sales revenues from
the crisis region.
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Econometrica (May 1980), pp. 817-38.We analyze 39 of the 100 ﬁrms in the “Standard
& Poor’s 100” stock-market index for calendar years
1997 and 1998.  We were limited to this subset of
the S&P 100 because the other ﬁrms did not pro-
vide a sufﬁciently detailed breakdown of interna-
tional sales.  Our criterion for inclusion in the
sample was that the ﬁrm’s reports must allow us
to calculate the ratio of sales to customers in Asia
to worldwide sales (where both items are stated in
U.S. dollar terms).
Sales data and balance-sheet information
(long-term debt and total assets) were taken from
each ﬁrm’s annual reports.  Data on consolidated
sales (including all subsidiaries) for each ﬁrm were
obtained from the income statement.  Data on
sales to customers in Asia were taken from the
notes to the consolidated ﬁnancial statements.  For
ﬁrms whose ﬁscal years did not coincide with the
calendar year, the dollar amounts of sales and the
end-of-ﬁscal year items were interpolated linearly
to determine corresponding calendar-year values.
Construction of the SALES variable
and lines of business
Data on international sales are provided in the
notes to the consolidated ﬁnancial statements in
annual reports of U.S. corporations.  Unfortunately,
current reporting of international sales is not stan-
dardized.  Many companies provide almost no
detail beyond a breakdown into domestic and for-
eign sales.  Only 39 of the S&P 100 ﬁrms provided
enough country or area detail to allow us to calcu-
late sales to the Asia/Paciﬁc region.  For example,
nine companies included sales data for areas out-
side Asia as part of their totals for Asia/Paciﬁc.  We
assumed that these ﬁrms combined sales totals
from regions where they do relatively little busi-
ness with regions where they are more active.
We believe the non-Asian sales included in the
Asia/Paciﬁc totals are insubstantial.
A second problem is that ﬁrms that distinguish
between sales to other departments or divisions
within the organization (intracompany sales) and
sales to unafﬁliated customers (third-party sales)
do not always do so on a consistent basis when
presenting geographic breakdowns.  In four cases,
ﬁrms did not distinguish between intracompany
and third-party sales on a geographic basis.  For
these four ﬁrms we know the total amount of intra-
company sales on a consolidated (world wide)
basis, but we do not know what percentage of sales
to Asia were intracompany.  In these four instances,
the sum of sales totals to the various world regions
will be greater than total sales (because intracom-
pany sales have not been eliminated).  Fortunately,
intracompany sales averaged only 5.4 percent of
third-party sales for these four ﬁrms.
The SIC two-digit code for each ﬁrm’s main line
of business was taken from the 10-K ﬁlings found on
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR
website <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>; 1998.
Financial Markets Data
Weekly total-return data for our 39 sample com-
panies and the S&P 500 index for 1997 and 1998
were purchased from Standard & Poor’s Compustat
and DRI respectively. Weekly returns were calculated
from Friday to Friday (closing prices), with adjustment
for stock splits and dividends.
The risk-free rate was proxied by a strategy 
of investing in three-month Treasury bills each
week, holding the bill one week, then rolling over
into the new three-month T-bill.  We collected 
the “on-the-run” three-month yield as well as the
“off-the-run” yield of the bill issued the previous
week for each week during 1997 and 1998 from
the Wall Street Journal.  Using these yields, we 
calculated prices.  Three-month T-bill log returns
were calculated as follows:
where P off,t is the price of the “off-the-run” issue at
time t; Pon,t-1 is the price of the “on-the run” issue
at time t-1; rt-1 is the value of the return index at
time t-1 (t 2 1 . 0); and r0 equals 100.
We used the log returns on two indexes of
Asian securities to measure the economic situation
in Asia.  These were the FT/S&P Actuaries World
Indices-Paciﬁc Excluding Japan, a Paciﬁc-region
stock-markets index, and the J.P. Morgan Emerging
Local Markets Index Plus (ELMI1)2Asia, a Paciﬁc-
region emerging-markets money-market index.
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International Limited, Goldman, Sachs & Co., and
Standard & Poor’s.  These indices are compiled by
FTSE International and Standard & Poor’s in
conjunction with the Faculty of Actuaries and the
Institute of Actuaries.  More information on the J.P.
Morgan Emerging Local Markets Index Plus can be
found in J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index
Monitor.  Both indexes are stated in U.S. dollar
terms based on current exchange rates.  Further
details are provided below.
At year-end 1998, the FT/S&P Actuaries World
Indices-Paciﬁc Excluding Japan index included Aus-
tralia (75 companies), Hong Kong (66), Indonesia
(26), New Zealand (18), The Philippines (22), Singa-
pore (41), and Thailand (35).  Malaysia (106 com-
panies as of September 25, 1998) was removed
from the index on October 1, 1998, following the
Malaysian government’s introduction of invest-
ment exchange controls on September 1, 1998.
According to the ground rules for the construc-
tion and maintenance of the FT/S&P Actuaries
World Indices, criteria for inclusion in the World
Indices are the following:
• Direct equity investment by non-nationals 
must be permitted;
• Accurate and timely data must be available;
• No signiﬁcant exchange controls should exist 
that would prevent the timely repatriation 
of capital or dividends;
• Signiﬁcant international investor interest 
in the local equity market must have 
been demonstrated;
• Adequate liquidity must exist.
Companies whose business is that of holding
equity stakes in other ﬁrms or other investments
are not excluded necessarily.  Equity-holding ﬁrms
that are excluded include split-capital investment
trusts and companies whose share price is a direct
derivation of the values of underlying holdings,
such as mutual funds.  Only shares listed on a
stock exchange are eligible for inclusion.  Where a
company does not list all its shares in an eligible
class, or does not list an entire class, these partially
listed or unlisted shares are not eligible.  All securities
comprising the bottom 5 percent of a country’s
market capitalization are excluded from the indices.
A security is totally excluded if foreign investors are
barred from ownership.  Calculation of the U.S.
dollar version of this index is explained in detail in
the FT/S&P Actuaries World Indices Ground Rules at
<http://www.ftse.com>.
The second ﬁnancial-market index we used was
the J.P. Morgan Emerging Local Markets Index Plus
(ELMI1) (U.S. Dollar Index)-Asia.  The ELMI1 tracks
total returns for local-currency-denominated money-
market instruments in 24 emerging markets.  It is
predominantly non-Latin America weighted and
includes four regional composites, Asia (48 percent
target weight as of January 29, 1999), Europe (18.26),
Latin America (23.07), and Middle East/Africa (10.67).
The ELMI1 employs a liquidity-sensitive weighting
system, which uses exports plus imports as a base.
Its portfolio consists of FX forwards, wherever
possible, to represent a country’s money markets.
A country is selected if it has been identiﬁed as
an emerging market with an economy large enough
to support signiﬁcant capital ﬂows, and has
accessible liquid local-currency-denominated
money-market instruments, either on- or offshore.
The Asian regional sub-index was used for this
analysis.  The countries included in the Asian
regional composite are China (4.167 percent of the
total index), Hong Kong (20.833), India (4.167),
Indonesia (16.67), The Philippines (4.167), Singapore
(20.833), South Korea (4.167), Taiwan (4.167), and
Thailand (20.833).  A special August month-end
rebalancing was performed to account for Russia’s
removal from the index, and a special September 8,
1998, rebalancing was performed to account for
Malaysia’s removal.
Target weights are derived by applying a series
of caps to the three-year, rolling, trade-weighted allo-
cation for each country.  Speciﬁcally, for countries
with convertible currencies, the weight per country
is limited to no more than 10 percent of the total
index.  For countries with nonconvertible currencies
or impediments to investing onshore, the weight per
country is limited to no more than 2 percent of the
index.  For each country subindex, a ladder of three
instruments was constructed, by initially investing in
one-, two-, and three-month instruments.  Each
month, the proceeds of the maturing instrument is
reinvested in a new three-month instrument.Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in the asset-pricing
regressions is each sample ﬁrm’s weekly excess
return, deﬁned as the difference between the log
total return on the ﬁrm’s stock and the risk-free
return.   A second-stage regression uses parameter
estimates from the ﬁrst-stage regression as the
dependent variable.  This parameter is the crisis-sen-
sitive component of each ﬁrm’s estimated market
beta, ˆ di,j (i = 1,...,39; j = 1997,1998).
Independent Variables
We used four total-return indexes with each
return denoted as follows:
Ri: Log change in total-return index of ﬁrm i
(weekly);
Rm: Log change in S&P 500 total-return index
(weekly);
Rf: Log change in three-month T-bill total- 
return index (weekly);
RAsia: Alternatively deﬁned as log change in the
FT/S&P total-return index or in the J.P.M.
total-return index (weekly).
Firm-speciﬁc variables include the following:
SALESi: Ratio of dollar amount of sales to
customers in Asia to dollar amount of
consolidated sales of ﬁrm i (annual);
DEBTi: Ratio of book value of long-term debt of
ﬁrm i to its total assets (end of calendar
year; annual);
SICxi: Indicator variable:  1 if the ﬁrm’s main
line of business falls into the two-digit SIC
division x, 0 otherwise (annual).
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